Attackers used stolen credentials from data provider Qubole to take over IAM roles across dozens of AWS accounts. Many of those roles had long been inactive.
Attackers compromised the cloud environments of numerous customers by exploiting credentials for Qubole’s AWS account, stealing secrets and data in the process. Cloud security company Wiz reported the incident, which it investigated alongside Sentra and Mandiant. The campaign ran from October 14 to 26, 2026, and affected dozens of companies, according to BleepingComputer. Sentra first detected the activity in the environments of several of its own customers. Qubole provides a cloud-based platform for processing and analyzing large volumes of data.
Trust Across Account Boundaries
Companies can grant third-party providers such as Qubole access to their AWS resources through cross-account IAM roles. Using the AssumeRole interface of the AWS Security Token Service (STS), providers receive temporary credentials to access customer resources.
The attackers compromised two IAM users in Qubole’s AWS account, with the second compromised on October 18. They used these accounts to assume roles in customer environments that still trusted Qubole, even though some of the roles had not been used for a long time. According to Wiz, many companies had failed to remove these trust relationships after they stopped using Qubole.
The External ID required for this process does not provide an additional layer of secrecy. AWS states that it is not considered a secret and is visible to anyone with access to the role.
Secrets Harvested and Validated
Once inside customer environments, the attackers explored available resources, extracted secrets from AWS Secrets Manager and the SSM Parameter Store, and inspected environment variables in Lambda functions. They also copied data from S3 buckets. Using the tool TruffleHog, the attackers checked whether discovered AWS keys, Microsoft Entra ID client secrets, and Okta credentials were valid.
Wiz also identified a separate campaign that ran from October 8 to 11. In this case, attackers used AWS access keys belonging to customers, which had likely been configured to connect to Qubole. How the attackers obtained Qubole’s credentials remains unknown. AWS said its own services had not been compromised. As of November 11, neither Qubole nor its parent company, Idera, had issued a public statement.
Remove Unused Roles
Wiz recommends that affected organizations review their CloudTrail logs dating back to October 1 for activity originating from Qubole’s AWS account. They should also investigate subsequent access to secrets and S3 resources. Any exposed credentials should be rotated, and active sessions associated with the compromised roles should be revoked. More generally, companies should remove trust relationships with third-party providers they no longer use.
To establish whether individual S3 objects were stolen, organizations must have S3 data events or server access logging enabled. A recent attack targeting application identities at MSP provider ConnectWise also demonstrated how attackers can exploit service provider access to infiltrate customer environments.
(Editorial Team)