Phishing Attempt

Log4Shell Exploit in VMware vCenter: Hackers Targeted Code-Signing Server

VMware vCenter, BO Team, Log4Shell, Log4Shell vulnerability in VMware vCenter Server, BO Team cyberattack on Russian software developer, VMware vCenter security breach and Log4Shell exploit
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For months, the BO Team group maintained a foothold inside a Russian software developer’s network, apparently preparing to distribute tampered software updates.

Security researchers at Kaspersky ICS CERT have uncovered a months-long intrusion into the development infrastructure of an unnamed Russian software developer. The campaign was attributed to the suspected Ukraine-linked threat group BO Team, also known as Black Owl, Hoody Hyena, and Lifting Zmiy. Unlike previous attacks, in which the group deployed ransomware and publicly celebrated its operations on Telegram, the attackers took an exceptionally covert approach this time. Their apparent objective was to launch a large-scale supply chain attack targeting the company’s Russian customer base.

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Initial Access Through SSH and an Unpatched Log4Shell Vulnerability

According to the analysis, which is based on an investigation launched in June 2025, the attackers initially gained access to a Linux terminal server through an exposed SSH service. From there, they explored the internal network and discovered a vulnerable VMware vCenter Server running version 7.0.3. By exploiting the well-known Log4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228), they obtained root privileges and used SSH to move laterally to the underlying hypervisor.

To maintain persistent access, the attackers set up an hourly cron job named “pgcache,” disguised as a legitimate PostgreSQL component. The script queried a domain hosted by the free DNS service nofrillsdns.com. As long as the associated DNS record pointed to the local address 127.0.0.1, the backdoor remained inactive. Only when the attackers changed the record did the script download the remote administration tool Global Socket (GSocket) and establish a discreet command-and-control channel.

Access to Source Code, Active Directory, and Code-Signing Servers

Over the following months, BO Team compromised nearly the entire IT environment, including Windows and Linux servers, workstations, backup systems, and security solutions. Using stolen certificates, the attackers gained access to a second virtualization cluster and extracted the memory of virtual machines. This allowed them to obtain credentials for the GitLab development platform, download source code repositories, and take control of the Ansible orchestration system using the server’s private key.

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On Windows systems, the attackers initially attempted to use the Nanodump tool but were blocked by security software. They then switched to the built-in Windows utility comsvcs.dll to dump the memory of the lsass.exe process. They also extracted the Active Directory database (ntds.dit) and exploited password reuse across administrator accounts in multiple domains to take control of the entire Windows infrastructure.

On Linux systems, they additionally modified the “nxnode-login” file to capture credentials during active login sessions. To avoid detection, the attackers consistently relied on existing system tools, a technique known as living off the land. They also manipulated timestamps and deleted event logs.

One server attracted particular interest: a Windows machine used to digitally sign completed software builds. Compromising this system would have given the attackers an ideal opportunity to inject malicious code into legitimate software updates or steal the code-signing certificate.

Phishing Attempt Using Stolen Mail Server Key Thwarted

After the company detected the incident, its response measures successfully drove the attackers out of the network before the suspected supply chain attack could be completed. However, BO Team made another attempt to regain access in late July. The group sent targeted phishing emails with the subject line “Account disconnected from the mail server,” directing recipients to a convincing replica of the company’s login page.

Because the messages successfully passed both SPF and DKIM checks, the attackers had apparently also obtained a private key belonging to the company’s mail server. However, the software developer’s security systems detected the phishing campaign in time and blocked access.

(Editorial Team)

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